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A PROPOSAL TO PREVENT THE STRANDING
OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS
In 1971 the unscrupulous practices of the American Union of
Students and the University Students Association left 1,500 to
2,000 air travelers stranded in Europe.' Similarly, the business
failure of a single United Kingdom air carrier caused thousands of
travelers to be stranded during the summer of 1972 and, according to one source, cost the American traveling public over
$700,000 in worthless expenditures.2 Statistics compiled by
United States embassies indicate that roughly 4,000 United States
citizens were stranded in Europe during the three-year period
from 1969 to 1971. 3 While these examples are indicative of the
most severe consequences of the air travel industry's performance
failures, they do not begin to measure the total economic impact
of such failures, since they do not include the out-of-pocket losses
of those who were stranded or the consequential damages suffered
by those individuals as a result of the imposition of unexpected
delays. Because even a relatively short international excursion
may involve an outlay of hundreds of dollars per passenger and
because even a single incident can affect numerous individuals,
the seriousness of these performance failures has attracted attention at both the federal and state levels, where efforts have been
initiated to pass corrective legislation. 4
After surveying industry structure in terms of market condi1 Both organizations sold what they claimed was round-trip charter transportation to
members of the general public. Ticket purchasers were asked to sign affidavits falsely
stating that they had been members for more than six months. The passengers were then
given a New York-London ticket and a voucher which was to be exchanged in London for
a ticket to the United States. However, the vouchers turned out to be worthless because
A.U.S. and U.S.A. had paid the carriers only for one way transportation, even though the
passengers had paid the round-trip fare. Insolvency has apparently shut A.U.S. doors. It
appears that the operators of U.S.A. simply absconded. S. REP. No. 92-925, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess.
14(1972).
2
1d. at 13.
3 Hearings on S. 2577 Bef)re the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.. ser. 92-38, at 55 (1971). Ihereafter
cited as Hearings on S. 25771. By its own terms the bill's purpose is "to amend the
International Travel Act of 1961 to provide for federal regulation of the travel agency
industry." Such regulation is aimed at the prevention of passenger strandings and consumer economic loss resulting from the business failures and unscrupulous practices of
certain members of the air travel industry. See part IV A infra.
"See part IVA infra.
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tions and actual practices, this article examines the failure of the
air travel industry 5 to provide bargained-for services to passengers. It compares the current regulatory pattern with alternative
regulatory proposals and scrutinizes each to determine both the
validity of the assumptions upon which they are based and the
relative effectiveness of each in achieving desired consumer protection. The purpose of this detailed examination is to make
possible the formulation of policy recommendations capable of
serving as a basis for regulatory reform.
The inquiry is limited to an investigation of breakdowns in the
provision of air transportation service as opposed to fluctuations
in the quality of service rendered. This limitation recognizes that
breakdowns are more readily identifiable and thus more easily
regulated, and that they are more serious in terms of the traveler's
welfare. The provision of contingent services6 is discussed solely
as an aid in defining the respective roles of the various industry
members. This limited scope of investigation is justified both
because air transportation failures pose the greatest inconvenience for the traveler and because the cost of air transport
often represents the largest single element of travel expenses.
Industry performance failures in the area of contingent services
are of relatively minor significance. Furthermore, regulation focused on the provision of air transportation should have an effect
on the standards of contingent services. Unscrupulous operators,
deprived of the economic advantages they enjoy in providing
illegal air transportation, will have little economic incentive to
remain in the industry. To the extent that contingent service
failures are traceable to such unscrupulous operators, industry
performance standards should improve, notwithstanding the fact
that the marketing of contingent services is not directly regulated.
I.

THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE

AIR TRAVEL INDUSTRY

Members of the air travel industry are described, for regulatory
purposes, by reference to role designation which is a function of
the service the member provides and the relationship he bears to
other industry members. Therefore, a working knowledge of the
5 For purposes of this article, a member of the air travel industry will be considered to
be any person or entity who either directly or indirectly offers or undertakes, whether as
principal, agent, broker, or otherwise, to arrange domestic or foreign air transportation in
return for compensation. See generally S. 2577, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(3) (1972).
6 Contingent services generally include meals, accommodations, ground transportation,
and any additional entertainment items provided in an air transportation package.
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functional structure of the air travel industry is essential if one is
to understand the scope and applicability of both current and
proposed regulatory patterns. The logic of the assignment of the
numerous functionally oriented role designations can best be understood if industry members are identified in relation to the two
general classes of services in which they deal: regularly scheduled
and charter.
A. Regularly Scheduled Services
Members of the air travel industry who provide regularly
scheduled services can be divided into three broad classifications.
First, the original suppliers of air transportation are the scheduled
air carriers themselves. In many instances the consumer deals
directly with these carriers by simply telephoning the airline for a
reservation or purchasing a ticket at an airline counter. In recent
years the scheduled carriers have endeavored to increase the
marketability of their services by making air travel more attractive
and convenient. To this end tour packages have been assembled
which include air transportation and such contingent services as
meals, lodging, and excursions at the point of destination. While
the airline may assemble and promote its own tour package, more
frequently the assembly and distribution of such service packages
is undertaken by a second group of industry members commonly
known as independent wholesalers. In return for a commission
the wholesaler contracts with various suppliers, including the
scheduled air carrier, to use their services in a package he prepares.7 The wholesaler does not, however, market the assembled
services directly to the consumer but distributes the package to a
third group of industry members, the retailers, who offer it for sale
directly to the traveling public.8 At times the retailer, most often a
travel agent, will assemble an individualized tour package for a
particular customer. The time-consuming nature of such work,
however, dictates that whenever possible the agent will simply
resort to a package provided by a wholesaler which, given the
great variety of tour offerings, can meet the consumer's demands
in the majority of cases.
7 In accordance with common industry practice the wholesaler most often contracts to
use such services on a consignment basis. Coupons are distributed to retailers which, when
sold to consumers, serve as vouchers to be traded for services during the course of a trip.
Upon such sale the retailer deducts his commission and forwards the remaining proceeds
to the wholesaler who must make satisfactory payment arrangements with the various
service suppliers so that they will honor the coupons he has issued. S. REP. No. 92-925.
supra note 1, at 12.
8
1d. at II.
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B. Charter Services
The functionally oriented terminology of the regulatory
agencies is made more complex in the area of charter services
because of the varied nature of the services that can be offered
and the relatively extensive array of specific regulatory provisions
with which industry members must comply when they undertake
to offer such services. While the role of the original service
supplier remains essentially unchanged from that performed in the
noncharter setting, that category is significantly enlarged because
supplemental air carriers, whose sole business is to provide air
transportation on a charter-only basis, are included in that category together with regularly scheduled air carriers who may also
supply transportation for charter flights. 9
The provision of charter services may be accomplished by two
distinct means. An original service supplier, acting independently
or in conjunction with its authorized retail travel agents, may offer reduced fares to members of a group if certain requirements
are met as to the qualifications of members and group size. This is
the so-called affinity group charter. 10 Alternatively, a single industry member identified as an indirect air carrier 1 may combine
the wholesale and retail functions. The indirect air carrier differs
from the simple wholesaler in that the former assembles not only
service packages but groups of passengers as well. Stringent federal regulations ordinarily apply to indirect air carriers, but exemptions may be obtained if the arrangements take the form of an
inclusive or study group charter. 12
II.

CURRENT REGULATION OF THE

AIR TRAVEL INDUSTRY

A. Self-Regulation
The regularly scheduled air carriers engage in substantial
self-regulation. The Air Transport Association of America
9 Charter services may be provided by air carriers holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 14 C.F.R. § 207.2 (1972). Since scheduled air carriers come under
the definition of air carrier established in 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970) and are required to
hold such certificate pursuant to id. § 137 l(a), they may offer charter services.
10
See notes 5 1-58 and accompanying text infra.
n1An indirect air carrier has been defined by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) as one
who "sells transportation by aircraft to the general public other than as an authorized agent
of a direct carrier in the consummation of transportation arrangements between the
operator of the aircraft and the passengers." Hacienda Hotels-U.S. Aircoach, 26 C.A.B.
372, 385 (1958).
12 See notes 59-68 and accompanying text infra.
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(ATA)' 3 has promulgated rules by which no member airline may
appoint or retain any person or business as its retail ticket agent
or as an authorized agency unless the person or agency is a
member in good standing of the Air Traffic Conference of America (ATC). 14 Because scheduled air transportation may be obtained only from an airline or its authorized agent, once the consumer
has made his purchase the carrier is bound to provide the air
transportation paid for. 15 Thus, association accreditation designed
to protect the airlines from agent mismanagement and default
indirectly insures that the consumer will receive the air transportation for which he has paid, even if the agent should fail to
forward the fare to the supplier.
B. Federal Regulation
1. The Federal Aviation Administration-The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates scheduled, supplemental,
and foreign air carriers primarily for the purpose of imposing
safety and airworthiness standards. Nevertheless, its regulatory
scheme, utilized in conjunction with the efforts of other federal
agencies, may serve to increase the general level of economic
protection offered the air travel consumer. FAA regulations prohibit scheduled and supplemental air carriers from providing
scheduled or charter services without first obtaining an operating
certificate. 16 In order to qualify for such certification a scheduled
or supplemental air carrier must demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the FAA that it is properly and adequately equipped to carry on
13 The ATA is a trade and service organization representing virtually all of the scheduled airlines of the United States. See Hearingson S. 2577, supra note 3, at 170.

14 The ATC is the marketing and services division of the ATA. In order to be considered a member in good standing, the retail agent is required to maintain a bond payable to
the airlines in the amount of $10,000. Further, he must report all ticket sales to the

respective airlines and remit the proceeds therefrom at ten-day intervals. Id. at 171-72.
15 This obligation results from the carrier's liability for the acts of its agents. See
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12 (1958) and the Air Traffic Conference Sales
Agency Agreement which authorizes the agent to "represent the Carrier for the purpose of
promoting and selling air passenger transportation offered by the carrier ...." AIR TRAFFIC CONFERENCE TRAVEL AGENTS HANDBOOK § 80.15, at I (4th rev., Oct. I, 1971).
Commenting on the efficacy of the carrier-agent relationship as a means by which the
consumer is protected, George A. Buchanan, Vice President of ATA, has stated:
It should be emphasized that an airline passenger who purchases a ticket
from an accredited travel agent for transportation on the scheduled airlines
runs absolutely no risk of losing that transportation dollar even though the
travel agent may ultimately not remit the proceeds to the airlines concerned.
This is so because the airline is responsible for the acts of its agents, and the
airline is required to perform the transportation even though it may never
receive payment therefor.
RESTATEMENT

Hearings on S. 2577, supra note 3, at 178-79.
16

14 C.F.R. § 121.3 (1972).
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safe flight operations 17 and must obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB)."' To obtain the CAB certification, scheduled and supplemental air carriers must agree to maintain and allow the Board
access to their financial accounts and records.19
*Additionally, supplemental air carriers, and scheduled air carriers providing charter services, 20 must permit the Administrator
of the FAA to make any financial inspection he deems necessary
to insure that operations are being conducted in accordance with
regulations. 21 Thus the FAA provides an additional means for
inquiring into the financial condition of those air carriers providing
charter services, 22 excluding foreign carriers.2 3 An exercise of the
combined investigatory powers of these two agencies may provide
a measure of consumer protection by identifying those scheduled
and supplemental carriers conducting business on a weak financial
basis. In this way carrier business failures may be more readily
predicted, and a variety of remedial measures might be under24
taken to protect passengers from financial loss.
17Id. § 121.271849 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1970).
19 Id. § 1377(e) reads:
The Board shall at all times have access to all ... [air carrier] accounts,
records and memoranda ...

and it may . . . inspect and examine any and all

such ... accounts, records, and memoranda. The provisions of this section
shall apply, to the extent found by the Board to be reasonably necessary for
the administration of this chapter, to persons having control over any air
carrier, or affiliated with any air carrier ....
See also note 26 infra.
20 14 C.F.R. § 121.5 (1972). See also note 9 supra.
21
Id. § 121.81 reads:
a) Each certificate holder shall allow the Administrator at any time or
place to make any inspections or tests to determine its compliance with the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Federal Aviation Regulations, its operating certificate and operations specifications, or its eligibility to continue to
hold its certificate.
b) In the case of a supplemental air carrier.., these inspections and tests
include inspections and tests of financial books and records ....
22 The CAB is authorized to inspect the accounts and records of air carriers. See note
20 supra. But the definition of air carrier does not include foreign air carriers. 49
U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970).
2 A foreign air carrier is defined as "any person other than a citizen of the U.S. who
undertakes, directly, by lease or other arrangement, to engage in air transportation." 14
C.F.R. § 1. 1 (1972). Thus the FAA has no investigatory powers with respect to foreign air
carriers. 14 C.F.R. pt. 129 (1972). But see notes 43 and 46 and accompanying text infra,
regarding the requirement that foreign air carriers obtain a permit to engage in foreign air
transportation and a statement of authorization for each charter flight.
2449 U.S.C. § 1429 (1970) reads in part:
If, as a result of any... reinspection or reexamination ... [the F.A.A. Administrator]. .. determines that safety in air commerce or air transportation
and the public interest requires, the Administrator may issue an order amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking, in whole or in part, any ... air
carrier operating certificate ....
Id. § 1371(g) states:
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Any regulatory pattern seeking to provide comprehensive and

effective consumer protection in the air travel market must rely
heavily upon existing investigatory powers to monitor closely the
activities of the carrier members of the air travel industry. To the
extent that the FAA might aid in this effort, it will contribute to
the level of economic protection afforded the air travel consumer.
2. The Civil Aeronautics Board-While the FAA is primarily
concerned with matters of operational safety, the CAB regulates
the air travel industry so as to provide the traveling public with
reliable air transportation at reasonable cost.25 Carriers seeking to
engage in the provision of regularly scheduled air services must
meet initial qualification requirements 2 6 and thereafter must conduct their scheduled service operations in a manner that is specifically prescribed and closely supervised by the CAB. 27 The system of regularly scheduled air service, however, entails certain
costs of inefficiency that are borne by the consumer. Because
scheduled services must be provided regardless of the immediate
demand for any particular flight, fares charged on such flights
must take into account the likelihood that operations may be
conducted at less than capacity. Thus, a portion of the air travel
dollar spent is for the convenience of having flights available on a
scheduled basis. The air travel demands of many consumers,
however, are sufficiently flexible to allow them to plan their departures well in advance and join with other travelers to form a group
The [Civil Aeronautics] Board upon petition or complaint or upon its own
initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend, modify, or suspend
any ... certificate [of public convenience and necessity], in whole or in part,
if the public convenience and necessity so require, or may revoke any such
certificate, in whole or in part, for intentional failure to comply with any
provision of this subchapter or any order, rule or regulation issued hereunder
or any term, condition or limitation of such certificate ....
In addition any person who violates applicable air carrier economic regulations is
subject to the imposition of civil penalties. Id. § 1471. If such violation is done knowingly
and willfully criminal sanctions may be imposed. Id. § 1472.
25 Id. § 1302.
26
1d. § 137 1(a):
No [U.S.] air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in
force a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Board
authorizing such air carrier to engage in such transportation.
Id. § 137 1(d)(1):
The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of the
transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the applicant is fit,
willing, and able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform to
the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and requirements of
the Board hereunder, and that such transportation is required by the public
convenience and necessity ....

Where the carrier limits its operations to the provision of charter services, the certificate
takes the form of a limited authorization to engage exclusively in the provision of supplemental air transportation. The requirements for issuance of this limited certificate are
virtually identical to those imposed on the scheduled air carriers. Id. § 137 I(d)(3).
27
See generally id. §§ 1371- 1387.
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which will fill a given aircraft for a particular flight. The existence
of many such consumers creates a market for charter services
which may be offered relatively inexpensively since the carriers
providing such supplemental services need offer only those flights
warranted by immediate consumer demand.
Recognizing the demand for lower cost nonscheduled services,
the CAB has authorized the controlled implementation of a variety of charter mechanisms. In deference to the scheduled air carriers who operate under a relative economic disadvantage, such
authorization has been limited by strict scrutiny of the routing and
frequency of supplemental operations in order to insure that charter flights do not infringe upon the established trade of the scheduled carriers. This has been accomplished in large part through
the imposition of regulatory requirements specifically identifying
those who may provide and use supplemental services and designating the circumstances under which such services may be provided. The wide scope of the CAB regulatory power also serves
to afford the consumer a measure of protection against performance shortcomings, unscrupulous practices, and business failures
of charterers and the carriers and agents with whom the charterer
must deal.
a. Identification of the Providers and Users of Charter Services-CAB regulations generally provide that no United States
air carrier2 8 may perform charter services 2 9 unless it has on file
with the Board a current tariff listing the services to be performed,
and enumerating the eligibility requirements to be met by prospective charter groups. 3 0 These requirements limit eligible charterers
to: (1) persons chartering an aircraft for their own use,3 1 in which
case resale of such transportation is prohibited; 3 2 (2) group representatives, no part of whose business is the formation of groups or
the solicitation or sale of transportation services; 33 and (3) domestic or foreign study group charterers0 4 Further, in the solicitation
of such charter business a carrier or its agent is prohibited from
28 This designation does not include air carriers certified for supplemental air service.
14 C.F.R. § 207.2 (1972). See notes 39-43 and accompanying text infra.

29 The major element of charter service is the air transportation itself. Charter flights are
designated as "air transportation performed on a time, mileage or trip basis where the
entire capacity of one or more aircraft has been engaged for the movement of persons and

their baggage, and/or property . . . ." 14 C.F.R. § 207.1 l(b) (1972).
30 Id. § 207.4.
31

32

1 d. § 207.11 (b)( I).
An individual attempting a resale under such circumstances would be considered an

indirect air carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970). As such, he would need CAB authoriza-

tion in order to operate legally. Id. § 137 1(a). See also notes 48-50 and accompanying text
infra.
33
34

14 C. F.R. § 207.11 (b)(2) (1972).
Id. § 207.1 l(b)(5). See also notes 65-68 and accompanying text infra.
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making payments, donations, or extending gratuities to any member of a qualified chartering organization. 3 5 Solicitation prohibitions notwithstanding, a carrier may name and pay a commission
to a charter group member acting as its authorized agent 3 6 Such
an arrangement gives rise to a legal relationship which obligates
the carrier to perform the services for which the agent has been
paid. 37 A further measure of consumer protection is provided by
CAB regulations requiring that the terms of service conform to
those listed in the tariff and that the carrier require the charterer
to pay the total charter price or post a bond in an equivalent
amount prior to the commencement of air transportation ?8
While the general regulatory provisions applicable to supplemental air carriers closely parallel those imposed on scheduled
carriers undertaking supplemental services, 3 9 the requirements
pertaining to supplemental carriers differ in three important respects. First, tour operators 40 are added to the list of eligible
charterers, 41 thus expanding the potential market for charter services. Second, if charter flight delays are caused by supplemental
air carrier error or omission the traveler may be entitled to have
alternative service provided him, or at his option receive an
immediate refund for services paid for but not yet performed; the
supplemental carrier must also pay for those incidental expenses
incurred by the consumer as a result of his unanticipated delay in
departure.4 2 Finally, consumer prepayments to a supplemental
carrier for air transportation must be placed in an escrow or trust
account, or a carrier performance bond must be filed in an equivalent amount5 3 The scope of consumer protection is thus broadened by imposing requirements on the supplemental carrier to
compensate passengers in the event of certain performance failures.
Both the scheduled and supplemental flight activities of foreign
air carriers are subject to CAB control by virtue of the requirement that such carriers obtain a permit to engage in foreign air
35 14 C.F.R. §§ 207.15(a),(b) (1972).
36

1d. § 207.15(c).

Cf. note 15 supra.
38 14 C.F.R. § 207.13 (1972).
39
See generally id. § 208.
40
Id. § 208.6(b)(4). A tour operator is defined by the CAB as a person authorized to
engage in the formation of groups for transportation on inclusive tours. Id. § 378.2(b)(5)(d).
37

41

42

See notes 3 1- 34 and accompanying text supra.

The exact form of the remedy is dependent upon the nature, time, and place of
performance failure. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 208.32a-.33 (1972). A discussion of the complex
formulas prescribing remedy form is beyond the scope of this article.
43 Id. §§ 208.40-.41. Additionally, the carrier must require that the charterer pay the
total charter price, or post an equivalent payment bond prior to the commencement of air
transportation, Id. § 208.32(e).
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transportation before undertaking to provide services between the
United States and other nations. 44 The Board may, without hearing, issue an order, subject only to a stay by the President,
amending or discontinuing a permit authorizing scheduled service
by a foreign air carrier if it finds that operations of that carrier
5
violate applicable law or adversely affect the public interest.
While limitations on permits authorizing foreign carriers to engage
in the provision of supplemental services closely parallel those
generally applied to supplemental carriers, conspicuously absent
are those consumer protection measures designed to insure that
the carrier will make recompense in the event of service breakdowns. 46 Foreign air carriers providing supplemental services are,
however, more closely scrutinized than their American counterparts in that a separate statement of authorization is required for
each charter performed. 4 7 The CAB thus exercises a measure of
control over foreign air carriers by limiting their entry into the
United States market and closely regulating their charter activities. In this way the Board seeks to provide the consumer with an
adequate degree of economic protection in his dealings with such
carriers in spite of the practical and political difficulties involved
in regulating a foreign national.
Indirect air carriers 48 comprise the final group of industry members providing charter services. To function in such capacity one
must obtain an air carrier operating certificate 49 or be exempted
from such obligation by virtue of the nature of the charter service
performed. Such exemptions for passenger transportation are
granted only to study group charterers and tour operators providing inclusive group charters.5 0 Enforcement of the prohibitions on
unauthorized indirect air carrier operations should insure that the
consumer deals only with legitimate, reputable carrier members of
the air travel industry.
b. The Circumstances Under Which Charter Services May Be
Performed- In order to obtain supplemental services, charter par44
The requirements for the issuance of such permits are virtually identical to those
imposed upon United States air carriers seeking a certificate of public convenience and

necessity. 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970).
45
14 C.F.R. § 213.3 (1972).
46
See generally id. § 214.

47 An application for authorization must identify the charterer, describe the nature of the
operation to be performed, and indicate whether the nation of foreign carrier registry
would grant a similar privilege to United States carriers. Id. § 212.5. The Board will grant

the authorization if it determines that the nation of registry would treat United States
carriers in a like manner and that the operation proposed will not have an adverse impact
on 4American
air carriers. Id. § 212.6.
8
See note I I supra.
See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
50 See notes 59 and 65 and accompanying text infra.
49
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ticipants must meet qualifications established by the CAB under
one of three alternative charter schemes. The first of these deals
with affinity group charters, whose participants are generally required to have been members of the chartering organization for a
minimum of six months prior to the departure date and must not
have joined merely to participate in the charter program. 51 There
are three subcategories of affinity group charters, the first of
which is the pro-rata plan 5 2 under which the total cost of the
charter is divided equally among the affinity group members actually transported. 3 In the event that the original cost estimated,
charged, and collected exceeds the actual cost; a refund must be
made to each participant on a pro-rata basis. 5 4 A second type of
affinity group arrangement is the mixed charter, so named because
the cost of the tour is borne partly by the charter participants and
partly by the chartering organization. 5 Functionally, the regulatory requirements imposed on both the group and the carrier are
identical to those applicable to the pro-rata plan. 6 Under what is
known as the single entity charter plan, 5 7 the chartering organization bears the entire cost of the excursion. Under this last plan
the charterer is exempted from the general regulatory provisions
requiring him to make advance payment or post a payment
58
bond.
The CAB recognizes two situations in which the requirements
applicable to affinity groups are relaxed so that charter flights may
be offered to members of the general public. Inclusive group
tours 59 may be offered publicly if forty or more participants are
carried as a single unit in a round-trip excursion of more than
seven days. 60 Further, accommodations and land transportation at
5114 C.F.R. § 207.41 (1972). The eligibility of a given group for charter services is
judged by the air carrier on the basis of a statement of the facts surrounding the origin and
membership of the organization that is required to be submitted prior to the closing of any
contract for services. Id. § 207.22(a). In those cases where the statement reveals that a
previous contract involving the group has been refused, the carrier is obligated to conduct
an independent inquiry into the eligibility of the group. Id. § 207.22(6). Once the charter
has been accepted the carrier must be supplied with and retain a passenger flight list giving
the name and address of each passenger and his affiliation with the chartering organization.
Id. § 207.45(a).
12 See generally id. § 208.200.
53 Cost is defined as the actual transportation expense plus a reasonable charge attributable
to administrative expenses. Id. § 208.213(c).
5
4 Id. § 208.2 13(b).
55 Id. § 208.36).
5

i See generally id. § 208.400.

57 Id. § 208.30).
58
Id. § 208.301. See also note 43 supra.
59
See generally 14 C.F.R. § 378 (1972).
60 Id. §§ 378.2(b),(b)(I). If the tour operator conducts his operations in accordance with
the regulations governing the provision of inclusive group tours, he is exempted from the
requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970), requiring that he have a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. 14 C.F.R. § 378.3 (1972).
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three points other than the point of origin must be included in the
package price.'" The Board regulates air transportation charges
for all inclusive group tours 6 2 and requires that a tour prospectus 63 and surety bond or its equivalent 6 4 be filed with the CAB
prior to the flight's commencement.
Charter flight privileges may be offered to study groups composed of students of a bona fide educational institution who are to
participate in a formal academic course of study abroad9 5 To
qualify in this category, the group must consist of a minimum of
forty students who are to spend at least four weeks abroad, and
the charter price must include at least two meals per day, accommodations, and ground transportation. 6 As in the case of the
inclusive tour, a prospectus, here termed a study group statement,
describing the nature of the program 6 7 and a surety bond or its
14 C.F.R. §§ 378.2(b)(2)-(3) (1972).
Id. § 378.15 reads:
No supplemental air carrier shall perform any charter trips for inclusive tours
unless such air carrier shall have on file with the Board a currently effective
tariff showing all rates, fares, and charges for such charter trips and showing
the rules, regulations, practices, and services in connection with such transportation.
63 Id. § 378.10:
No inclusive tour or series of tours shall be operated, nor shall any tour
operator sell or offer to sell, solicit, or advertise such tour or tours unless
there is on file with the Board a Tour Prospectus ....
Id. § 378.13:
The prospectus shall include copies of the charter contract, the contract
between the tour operator or foreign tour operator and tour participants,
[and] the tour operator's or foreign tour operator's surety bond ....
4
6 Id. § 378.16:
(a) [T]he tour operator or foreign tour operator shall furnish a surety
61

62

bond ....

(b) The supplemental air carrier and the prospective tour operator or
foreign tour operator may elect, in lieu of furnishing a surety bond as
provided under paragraph (a)... to comply with the requirements [that]:
(I) The tour operator or foreign tour operator.., furnish a surety bond in
a minimum amount of $10,000 per flight up to a maximum amount of
$200,000 for a series of 20 or more flights ... the bond to continue in effect
until completion of the tour or series of tours ....
(2) The supplemental air carrier and tour operator or foreign tour operator
shall enter into an agreement with a designated bank, the terms of which shall
provide that all deposits by tour participants paid to tour operators or foreign
tour operators and their retail travel agents shall be deposited with and
maintained by the bank ....
65 d. § 373.2.
66 Id. If the group qualifies, the charterer is exempted from the requirement of 49
U.S.C. § 1371 (1970) that he have a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 14
C.F.R. § 373.3 (1972).
67 14 C.F.R. § 373.10(c) (1972) reads:
The statement shall include copies of the charter contract, the contract
between the study group charterer and the student participants, the study
group charterer's surety bond.., and where applicable, a copy of the depository agreement with a bank ....
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equivalent 6 8 must be filed with the CAB prior to the beginning of
the trip.
3. The Federal Trade Commission -Although not directly
charged with regulation of the air travel industry, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) possesses regulatory powers over certain industry members should they engage in deceptive acts or
practices in their dealings with the public, either personally or
through media advertising.6 9 When the Commission has reason to
believe that a deceptive act has occurred it may serve a complaint
upon the alleged offender and conduct a hearing, after which time
a cease and desist order may be issued. 70 In this way members are
made to conform to FTC standards regulating their commercial
contact with the consumer. Thus, the Federal Trade Commission
is in a position, as are the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the air travel industry itself, to aid
and in some measure to protect the consumer when he seeks to
procure air travel services.
III.

THE COMPREHENSIVENESS AND UTILITY

OF PRESENT REGULATIONS

That air passengers continue to be stranded indicates that the
present regulatory efforts of federal agencies and the air travel
industry are producing less than optimal results. An examination
of these regulatory requirements seems to indicate that the problem does not arise from a lack of rulemaking authority. Rather it
is a product of the practical difficulties involved in identifying,
monitoring, and controlling the activities of certain industry members engaged in unscrupulous or financially irresponsible practices.
Industry self-regulation governing the retail sale of scheduled
services has proven to be reasonably comprehensive and offers an
adequate degree of consumer protection. 71 Although agent
68 The surety bond requirements imposed on study group charterers are virtually identical to those imposed upon tour operators. Id. § 373.15. See also note 64 supra.
69 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The Commissioner, however, enjoys no such regulatory powers over air carriers. Id. § 45(a)(6).
70 Id. § 45(b). The responsibility for the enforcement of Commission orders and additional civil penalties, if any, is placed in the hands of the Attorney General. Id. § 56.
Additionally, Chapter 63 of the Federal Criminal Code provides for the fining and imprisonment of any individual who makes use of the postal service, wire, radio, or television in
an attempt to defraud or obtain money or property by means of fraudulent representations
or promises. To the extent that members of the air travel industry solicit business in such a
manner they would fall within the scope of these sanctions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341- 1343
(1970).
71 See notes 13- 15 and accompanying text supra.
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defaults do occur, the resulting losses represent but a small proportion of the total dollar value of services 72 sold by agents and
such losses are borne exclusively by the respective air carriers. 73
Self-regulation in the charter area has been less effective primarily
because of the fact that, in accordance with customary industry
practice, the original suppliers of air transportation frequently deal
with indirect air carriers who are acting independently and not as
agents of the original suppliers. 74 As such the institutionalized
principal-agent relationship, which works so effectively to provide
consumer protection with respect to the purchase of scheduled
75
services, has found no counterpart in the charter area.
Unfortunately, existing federal regulations, the bulk of which
are aimed specifically at those engaged in the provision of supplemental services, have proved only partially successful as a substitute for effective self-regulation. Because of the high demand for
inexpensive air transportation and the strict regulatory limitations
imposed on legitimate industry members who offer charter transportation, a lucrative black market has been created in the provision of low-cost charter flights. A common ploy used by unscrupulous operators is to form bogus study group charters, or affinity
groups composed of participants solicited from the general public.

76

Such activities are clearly detrimental to legitimate industry

members and the scheduled air system, and the participant in the
illegal charter very often suffers as well. The illegal operator can
realize a substantial profit by charging the traveler for a "bargain"
round-trip air transportation and contingent service package while
actually engaging a carrier for one-way transportation only. The
charterer simply pockets the difference and departs the scene.
While CAB regulations require that a charterer make full cash
payment or its equivalent to the carrier before the commencement
of air transportation, 7 7 there are no requirements in the case of an
affinity group or study group charter that the passage beround-trip. 78 Thus the operator is free to contract with and pay
72 During 1970 net loss incurred by air carriers as a result of agent default amounted to
$911,800. During that same year, total sales by authorized agents amounted to $2.25
billion.
See Hearingson S. 2577, supra note 3, at 179.
73
See note 15 supra.
74
See note I I and accompanying text supra.
75 See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. However, the National Air Carrier
Association, which is composed of the eight leading United States supplemental air
carriers, is considering the implementation of a program of agent designation. See Hearings
on S. 2577, supra note 3, at 202.
76
See S. REP. No. 92-925, supra note I, at 12. See also note I and accompanying text
supra.
77 See note 43 supra.
78 Requirements as to round-trip transportation are imposed in the case of affinity groups
only where four or more round-trip flights are performed on behalf of a single chartering
organization in one calendar year. 14 C.F.R. § 207.13(c) (1972). There are no regulations
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the carrier for one-way transportation only. The operator will
issue the passenger a voucher for the return ticket, 79 but if the
charterer has not paid the carrier for the return flight, the passenger's voucher will be worthless. He will be forced to secure
whatever alternative return transportation he is able to afford. 8 0
An individual offering charter services on such a basis is operating as an indirect air carrier without required authorization. 8 1 As
such he is subject to civil and criminal sanctions which may be
imposed by the CAB, 82 as well as to private remedies initiated
against him by those he has stranded. The greatest problem in
initiating and applying such remedies lies in locating the guilty
parties. The illegal operation is typically of an ephemeral nature,
requiring nothing more permanent than a rented office and a
telephone. Large amounts of money can be made in a single
charter transaction after which the entire operation can be dismantled and moved or simply abandoned. Even if the individual
could be found, as would most likely be the case where a legitimate business failure rather than chicanery is involved, the imposition of federal sanctions would not serve to compensate the
consumer and private civil remedies would be of little value
against a judgment-proof defendant.
In the area of charter flights it is evident that while the existing
regulatory pattern provides some degree of consumer protection,
it has failed to prevent the recurrence of passenger strandings and
consequent economic loss. This is a result in large measure of the
system's inability in certain instances to deter or detect regulatory
violations and to predict potential insolvencies. Significantly,
while both preventive and remedial sanctions are employed, in the
event of a service failure none of the existing federal or private
programs can offer the stranded passenger any form of immediate
relief. Until a regulatory scheme can be devised which directly
aids the stranded passenger while he is stranded, the consumer
will be denied an adequate measure of economic protection in his
dealings with the members of the air travel industry.
requiring that study group tours be round-trip. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text
supra. All inclusive group tours must be round-trip. See notes 59-64 and accompanying
text supra.

11 It is common industry practice to issue vouchers to trip participants, which vouchers
are to be exchanged for a return flight ticket at the carrier's counter at the airport where
the return flight originates. See note 7 supra.
80 Any air carrier seeking to provide alternative air transportation could do so only in
accordance with CAB regulations unless a specific exemption were issued by the CAB.
See Hearings on S. 2577, supra note 3, at 54-55. Thus an altruistic carrier could not
provide free or reduced cost return transportation without Board approval. 49
U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) (1970).
81See text accompanying notes 48- 50 supra.
5249 U.S.C. §§ 1471- 1472 (1970).
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PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

A. Senate Bill 257783
At the close of the last session of Congress, there was pending
proposed legislation of a preventive nature that was intended to
bring about an improvement in the performance record of the
travel industry through the imposition of industry-wide membership standards.8 4 Under the bill, members of the industry,85 with
the exception of carriers,8 6 would be required to obtain a registration certificate.8 7 Because carriers would be prohibited from entering into travel service contracts with unregistered agents,8 8 the
possession of a certificate of registration would become a practical
necessity if one were to participate in the travel industry.8 9
a3S. 2577, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). The bill was passed by the Senate on June 29,
1972, and was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
June 30, 1972. Letter from John D. Dingell, Member of Congress, to the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Sept. 11, 1972, on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform. The bill, designated H.R. 17223, was introduced in the House and
was assigned to that committee on October 18, 1972. 118 CONG. REC. H 10,409 (daily ed.
Oct. 18, 1972). As of January 31, 1973 the bill had not been introduced into the 93d
Congress.
84 Several states have proposed legislation calling for the licensing of travel agents. See,
e.g., H.B. 1707, 77th III. Gen. Ass. (1971); S.B. 1157, Reg. Sess. 76th Mich. Legis.
(1972). The proposed state measures differ only slightly from the federal bill and would be
rendered moot in the event of its final enactment. S. 2577, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 212
(1971). Given the international scope of the activity which is sought to be regulated and
the dilemma in which travel industry members would find themselves in trying to comply
with a variety of state laws, regulation on a state-by-state basis would seem to be less
desirable and potentially less effective than federal legislation.
85 An industry member is one who engages in the business of conducting a travel
agency, which means the
holding out by any person ... to any other person, directly or indirectly, as
being able or offering or undertaking, by any means or method whether acting
as principal, agent, broker, or otherwise to acquire for a fee, commission, or
other valuable consideration, of any sort, travel reservations or accommodations, tickets for domestic or foreign travel by air, rail, ship, bus, or
other medium of transportation, hotel, or other lodging reservations or accommodations.
S. 2577, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(3)(D) (1970).
8 Id. § 203(3)(A). The rationale for such exclusion is that carriers are adequately
regulated by existing federal agency programs. See S. REP. No. 92-985, supra note 1, at
11. While indirect air carriers are arguably exempted from the registration requirements
under the language of the bill, such an exemption would not seem warranted in view of the
numerous instances of regulatory violations involving just such industry members.
a7 S. 2577, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 204(a) (1970).
88 Id. § 204(b).
89 Because the various carriers have an economic interest in maintaining a good industry
image in the eyes of the consumer, it is reasonable to believe that they would exercise the
minimal efforts required to serve as an enforcement mechanism by not dealing with
unregistered agents. If such efforts are not forthcoming, appropriate sanctions may be
employed. Id. § 211 provides:
(a) Any person who knowingly and willfully violates any provision of this
title or any order, rule or regulation issued under any such provision, shall, if
it is the first such offense, be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not

WINTER 1973]

Airline Passenger Strandings

The requirements for agent registration would be established by
the Secretary of Transportation,9" while the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of registered agents would be promulgated
by the Travel Agents Registration Board. 9 1 Once obtained, registration would be subject to revocation if a review of the agent's
activities disclosed that the registrant had engaged in prohibited
practices. 9 2 Further, civil and criminal penalties would be established for noncompliance with the provisions of the act or the
93
rules and orders promulgated thereunder.
In setting up a regulatory scheme which relies upon responsible
industry members to monitor and in some measure control the
activities of the industry which they head, 94 the sponsors of the
bill had identified and attempted to correct the major shortcomings of the present regulatory system. However, while the
prohibition against carriers' contracting with nonregistered agents
would undoubtedly improve the current situation, problems inherent in the scope and nature of the bill's regulatory pattern
render it a less than adequate consumer protection device. While
a carrier may be subject to fine or imprisonment for contracting
with an unregistered agent, if a service failure results the stranded
passengers would still be left without an immediate remedy by
which to extricate themselves from their predicament? 5 Further,
even if the carrier should comply with the provisions of the bill, to
the extent that the sheer number of current certificate holders and
new applicants may be more than the Travel Agents Registration
Board could adequately review, 96 the possession of such certificates may little reflect the quality of the agent. Thus, while the
carrier may avoid statutory liability by dealing only with registered agents, the bill is potentially ineffective in providing the
airlines with a better method to chose reliable agents. A great deal
more than six months, or both, and for any subsequent such offense, shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both. If

such violation is a continuing one, each day of such violation shall constitute
a separate offense.
90 Id.

§ 206.
91 The Travel Agents Registration Board is established by the bill and consists of eight
members appointed by the Secretary of Transportation. Id. § 205(d).
92 Id. § 208.

93 A civil penalty not in excess of $1,000 may be, applied. Id. § 208. In addition, the
penalties listed under § 21 1 would also be applicable. See note 89 supra.
94 See note 89 supra.
95 See note 80 supra.
96 In 1971 there were 7,400 travel agency locations accredited by the Air Transport
Association of America. See Hearings on S. 2577, supra note 3, at 170. But by the terms

of the bill many more industry members would have to be registered since the bill's
requirements include not only travel agencies, but wholesalers, charterers, and tour operators as well. See note 86 supra. While registration certificates would come up for renewal
at two year intervals, it is intended that such renewal be Perfunctory unless a prior
suspension or revocation has been imposed. S. 2577, 92d Cong.. 2d Sess. § 207(d) ( 1971).
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of the consumer protection ostensibly afforded by the preventive
thrust of the bill may be largely illusory. As a practical matter,
most regulatory power under the new bill would be exercised in a
remedial capacity resulting in enforcement problems identical to
97
those experienced under existing regulatory programs.
The additional costs that the bill would impose do not seem to
be justified by the marginal benefits that would accrue to the
traveling public. Beyond the tax cost of funding an additional
federal program, 98 there is the danger that barriers to entry in the
form of registration requirements may reduce reputable as well as
illegitimate competition in the travel industry. To the extent that
the bill thus works to curtail the supply of honest services available, the consumer may ultimately suffer. Furthermore, the proposal would necessitate the outlay of funds to achieve an end that
duplicates, at least in part, the efforts of existing regulatory bodies. The single greatest shortcoming of the bill, however, is that it
fails to provide the stranded passenger with any immediately
available remedy.
B. An Alternative Proposal
The purpose of the proposal which follows is to demonstrate
that the adoption of a number of significant regulatory reforms,
requiring little in the way of increased federal expenditures or
control, would produce a sufficient level of consumer protection.
The basic tenet of this alternative proposal is that self-regulation
should be utilized to the maximum extent possible and can best be
spurred by placing the ultimate responsibility for the prevention
and remedy of service failures on the air carriers themselves. Air
carriers, being the original suppliers of the service in question and
perhaps the air travel industry's most stable members, are in the
best position to supervise the industry and will adequately do so if
federal regulations require. Furthermore, the reforms needed to
induce such carrier action are well within the power of existing
federal agencies and will require neither new legislation nor the
creation of additional administrative bodies.
In order to establish an adequate scheme of self-regulation with
which air carriers can comply at a minimum of inconvenience and
expense, the CAB should require that no air carrier transport any
charter group member from his original point of departure unless
97 See generally part I I I supra.
98 The Senate Committee on Commerce estimates that the additional cost to the Department of Transportation in order for it to discharge its responsibilities under S. 2577 would
be $600,000 per annum. See S. REP. No. 92-925, supra note I, at 27.
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it has made inquiry as to the provision by the charterer for the
passenger's return transportation. The air carrier would have to
establish to its satisfaction either that return passage has been
reserved and paid for through itself or another air carrier, or that
no return air passage has yet been provided, in which case the
carrier would be required to notify each charter passenger of that
fact prior to the commencement of the flight. Such notification
could be evidenced by an affidavit signed by each passenger
whose return air passage has not been secured stating that he has
been apprised of the situation prior to departure. If an air carrier
has not complied with these regulations and passengers are subsequently stranded as a result of the charterer's failure to pay for
return air service, the air carrier originally transporting the passenger would be required to provide return air transportation to
the original departure point. The production of an executed passenger affidavit would serve to release the original carrier from
liability for the provision of return air transportation should a
stranding occur.
In practice the air carrier would probably initially inquire of the
charterer as to the provisions that had been made for the charter
group's return passage. If the airline doubted the integrity of the
charterer or chose to pursue a conservative charter policy, it
might independently investigate to determine whether adequate
return transportation had been reserved and paid for. 99 Departing
passengers would be notified in the event that the investigation
revealed that arrangements for return air transportation had not
yet been finalized and the carrier could demand that the passenger
sign the affidavit before he enplanes. Should he refuse, the air
carrier would be justified in refunding the ticket price and air
transportation could be denied. In the event that passengers
allowed to embark without having signed affidavits were stranded,
the carrier would be required to provide alternative return transportation, employing either its own facilities or those of scheduled
or supplemental carriers servicing the stranded passengers' location. In determining the form such alternative transportation
should take, and the speed with which it must be provided, the
inconvenience to the stranded passenger must be weighed against
the carrier's increased costs. The carrier would also have to pay
any necessary incidental expenses of the passengers as under
current regulations.1 00 If the carrier failed to provide alternative
transportation, strict sanctions would be imposed. Given the past
99 See note 102 infra.
100See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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record of the air carriers in assisting stranded individuals, such
sanctions might never need to be applied. 10 '
While the burden placed upon the air carrier under such a
scheme might appear to be great, close examination reveals that it
is actually quite manageable. The verification procedure employed
before departure is easily and inexpensively administered. If the
carrier is dealing with a charterer whom it knows to be reputable
from past experience, it may decide that the risk involved in not
making the inquiry is small and thus forego it altogether. In the
case where return passage is by way of the same carrier, verification is easily accomplished since the departing and return
arrangements would be finalized in the same transaction. Even
where return passage is arranged through an alternative source,
the established network of communication among air carriers
should make verification of confirmed bookings a relatively simple
10 2
matter.
If, despite the preflight investigation, the carrier is still uncertain as to the likelihood of his incurring liability for return passage, there are several courses of action he may follow. In the
short run, it may decide to risk incurring liability and rely upon
civil remedies against the charterer or second carrier if they
misrepresent as to the verification of return transportation. Should
the risk still appear too great, the carrier may simply refuse to
deal with what it suspects are unscrupulous operators. In the long
run, if liability is incurred by even the most meticulous carrier, the
carriers are in a much stronger position than the individual consumer to pursue and obtain a remedy or to absorb a specific loss.
Furthermore, because the carriers face this hazard on a continuing basis, it may be possible to secure insurance to protect
against such liability. In either event, the cost of premiums or
losses may be passed on by the carrier and borne equally by all air
travelers in the form of higher fares. Additionally, the imposition
of such liability may induce the air carriers to construct an authorized agent system for the marketing of charter services along the
101American scheduled and supplemental air carriers during 1971 returned 4,278
stranded individuals to the United States. Such passage was afforded at reduced fare or no
charge. See Hearings on S. 2577, supra note 3, at 54-55. While such efforts are laudatory,
they do not always suffice as an immediate remedy. Thus consumer inconvenience, delay,
and economic loss continue even though their effect on the consumer is mitigated in some
instances.
102 The apparent ease with which the scheduled carriers communicate with each other is
demonstrated by their ability to confirm immediately the time, routes, and availability of
passenger space on other scheduled carriers. If such a system of instantaneous communication and verification is economically viable in the scheduled area, there is little reason
to believe that it could not be expanded to accommodate both scheduled and supplemental
carriers providing charter services.
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lines of the Air Transport Association-Air Traffic Conference
model. 10 3 This would provide a further measure of protection to
the carriers and the consumer as well.
Because of the increased financial and regulatory responsibilities placed upon the carriers themselves, existing federal
agencies would be warranted in intensifying their examinations of
the financial standing of the respective air carriers. The CAB, in
conjunction with the FAA, currently possesses the power to
10 4
examine the books and records of United States air carriers.
Intensified scrutiny would serve to identify carriers operating on a
financially insecure basis. Particular care could then be exercised
by the CAB to insure that supplemental carriers falling within this
category strictly comply with existing bonding requirements.' 0 5 In
addition the existing bonding requirement could be extended to
cover all air carriers undertaking to provide charter services. In
the case of foreign air carriers the fulfillment of this requirement
could be made a condition for obtaining a statement of authorization for supplemental services.' 06 Since such statements must be
obtained for a specifically proposed trip or trips, intense operational scrutiny could be maintained notwithstanding the lack of a
practical ability to examine books and records. Finally, the economically troubled carrier could be required to make the confirmed reservation check which is usually made at the carrier's
option.
Thus with a minimum of alteration in the current regulatory
structure, the major shortcomings of the existing system could be
significantly mitigated if not finally resolved. Passengers would
not be stranded as a result of the failure of charterers to make
payments in advance of the rendering of service since the initial
air carrier would be required to provide for return transportation
within a reasonable time. Though ineligible groups might still
secure air transportation, to the extent that the ability of unscrupulous operators to make a quick profit is impaired, the incidence
of violations of charter provision requirements should be significantly curtailed. Finally, although service failures resulting
from the financial collapse of an air carrier will always present a
potential problem, rigorous financial scrutiny by federal agencies
should make for greater predictive abilities which in turn should
reduce the danger that an individual will be left without an immediate remedy in the event he is stranded.

103 See

notes 13- 15 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 19 and 21 and accompanying text supra.
1w See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
106 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
104
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It should be made clear that the adoption of this proposal
would not guarantee the actual provision of air travel that has
been paid for prior to the date of departure, nor would it guarantee that bargained-for services other than air transportation would
be adequately provided during the course of a trip. There will still
be no substitute for the exercise of sound discretion by the consumer in his choice of those with whom he deals in the air travel
industry. Yet if the proposal is successful in making it nearly
impossible for unscrupulous operators to make quick illegal
profits by not providing the full amount of air service for which
the consumer has paid, participation in the industry by such
operators should be significantly diminished. To the extent that
unscrupulous operators are driven out of the market, the consumer should be better able to choose a reputable industry member who will provide him with adequate service in all areas of his
travel needs.
No matter how carefully a regulatory system may be devised or
how effectively it may operate, if a market exists within which
sizeable illegal profit may be made, the total elimination of illegal
practices may well be an impossibility. The charter service area of
the air travel industry, in competition with the protected scheduled air system, presents just such a lucrative market. 10 7 A recent
CAB proposal for an adjustment in the rules governing charter
flights may significantly reduce black market operations by cutting
market demand for illegal services. The new nonaffinity charter 0 8
proposal would alter the rules governing charter flights such that
any group of individuals numbering forty or more could secure air
transportation at charter rates, provided that the group notifies the
carrier at least ninety days in advance and makes a nonrefundable
deposit of 25 percent of the total air fare. 10 9 Both supplemental
and scheduled air carriers could offer this newly proposed service.
The Board stated,
There is an irresistible and understandable public demand for
low-cost air transportation, much of it on charter services;
this demand has heretofore been met all too often by flouting
existing charter rules; ... it is therefore in the public's interest to promulgate new rules which will enable the consumers'
1 10
needs to be satisfied in a lawful manner.
This statement by the CAB evinces recognition that illegal oper1 7

1

See part II B 2 supra.

10837

Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972).

109 In addition, the charter must be for round-trip transportation and requirements are

imposed as to the minimum duration of the trip. Id. at 20809.
110 Id.
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ations can perhaps best be curtailed by legalizing that which is
prohibited and placing the provision of such service in the hands
of reputable industry members. Implicit in the Board's statement
is the realization that scheduled carriers may not need the amount
of regulatory protection that was once deemed necessary and that
to the extent that the scheduled carriers may engage in nonaffinity
charter operations it would allow them to defray a portion of the
cost of running scheduled flights.
The CAB's experiment with the nonaffinity charter appears to
be a viable reform which may reduce the incidence of illegal
activities, thus lightening the regulatory burden faced by all federal agencies concerned with the protection of the air traveler. This
liberalization of the restraints on the provision of charter services,
coupled with a plan employing air carriers as the principal regulatory enforcement mechanism, could constitute an economical
yet efficient regulatory system which would secure the desired
consumer protection only inadequately provided under the current system of regulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The continued maintenance of an efficiently run, smoothly
functioning air travel industry is of major importance to the consumers of travel services and the entire United States economy.
Federal regulatory efforts are designed to shape industry service
offerings and performance standards in conformance with the
perceived national need, while providing the consumer with an
adequate degree of economic protection in his dealings with the
members of that industry. The multifaceted nature of the air travel
industry makes it difficult for federal policy to make adequate
adjustments among the variety of interests competing for acceptance or reflect the legitimate needs and desires of each interested
consumer or industry sector. Under the existing hierarchy of
values the provision of charter services is clearly held subordinate
to the maintenance of the scheduled air system. Thus, existing
consumer abuse in the air travel market is in one sense the result
of the inability of legitimate industry members to meet the increased consumer demand for low-cost charter services. This
inability results from the imposition of those restraints on the
provision of charter services deemed both necessary and reasonable in light of federal policies prescribing the form the air travel
industry is to take. Without questioning the validity of the assumptions upon which this restrictive policy is based, it is evident
that consumer abuse is occurring under the present regulatory
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system, resulting in service failures and monetary expenditures
for which inadequate service is provided.
With the increased demand for and use of charter services the
potential for abuse will be greatly enhanced unless current policies are reevaluated and regulatory practices amended so as to
conform with market and enforcement realities. However, while
policy-makers should not remain intransigent in the face of
changed conditions, there is a danger of overreaction. This article
has argued that adequate levels of consumer protection may in
fact be achieved through the imposition of relatively minor regulatory changes which would give air carriers a strong economic
interest in monitoring the activities of their fellow industry members. Consumer protection measures can be shaped to meet specific problems by relying on existing self-regulatory efforts when
these efforts are adequate and by inducing the industry to undertake equally efficient and effective self-regulation where it is
presently lacking.
-RichardJ. Gray

